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Abstract
.This article discusses the tensions between two aspects of institutional change in the EU: the 
adaptation of institutional arrangements with the prospect of the legitimization of Community 
governance within a policy-making arena on the one hand, and the external evaluation of these 
institutional developments from the viewpoint of democratic theory on the other. Taking up the 
example of EU Social Policy, the argument proposed is twofold: First, a reconstruction of the 
institutional evolution in this field shows that strong tendencies towards the adaptation of 
Community governance to its contested legitimacy base – with regard to power relations, the 
behaviour of actors, the definition of policy ideas and the mechanisms of institutional change itself 
– are present. Second, evaluating these changes from the perspective of democratic theory reveals 
legitimacy deficits that are not just related to the imbalance of the input- and output-dimensions of 
legitimacy, but also to the tension between different normative standards of legitimate governance. 
Kurzfassung
Dieser Artikel diskutiert das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen zwei Aspekten des institutionellen 
Wandels in der EU: der Anpassung institutioneller Arrangements mit dem Ziel der Legitimierung 
des europäischen Regierens innerhalb eines Politikfeldes einerseits, und der externen Bewertung 
dieser institutionellen Veränderungsprozesse aus einer demokratietheoretischen Perspektive 
andererseits. Am Beispiel der EU-Sozialpolitik werden zwei Argumente entfaltet: Erstens zeigt 
eine Rekonstruktion der wesentlichen institutionellen Entwicklungen in diesem Politikfeld auf vier 
Ebenen – der Machtverteilung, der Entwicklung der Akteurs- und Prozessebene, der Definition von 
Leitideen, und dem Ablauf institutioneller Veränderungsprozesse – übergreifende Tendenzen der 
Anpassung des EU-Regierens an ihre fragile Legitimitätsgrundlage. Zweitens werden aber aus 
einer demokratietheoretischen Perspektive normative Legitimitätsdefizite deutlich, die sich nicht 
nur auf das Ungleichgewicht zwischen den Input- und Output-Dimensionen demokratischer 
Legitimität, sondern auch auf das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen konkurrierenden normativen 
Standards des legitimen Regierens zurückführen lassen. 
The author
Frank Wendler is PhD candidate in the programme "The Future of the European Social Model" at 
the University of Göttingen; email: F.Wendler@gmx.net 
Seite 1 von 1 EIoP: Text 2004-007: Abstract
06.07.2004 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-007a.htmContents: 
z 1. Introduction  
z 2. The point of departure: The constitution of the EU as an arena of social policy-making on a 
contested legitimacy base  
z 3. Tendencies of institutional adaptation in the historical development of EU Social Policy 
{ 3.1. Towards the multi- actor and multi-level: Building networks and promoting 
subsidiarity  
{ 3.2. Proceduralisation of policy-making: from rule-setting to preference formation  
{ 3.3. Connecting to the Lisbon goals: The re-definition of the European Social Model?  
{ 3.4. The flexibilisation of institutional change  
z 4. The viewpoint of democratic theory: two approaches  
z 5. Conclusion  
z References  
1
1. Introduction  
For some time now, scholars of European integration have become interested in the interrelation 
between the institutional development of the EU polity and its democratic legitimacy. In connection 
to this, a conceptual turn can be observed with regard to the analytical perspective on institutions and 
their development: By turning around the focus of ‚classical‘ integration theories on the causes of 
institutional evolution, especially the broad literature associated with the ‚governance‘ approach to 
European integration has been influential in concentrating on the effects of institutional change for 
policy-making in the European Union – thus departing from the point of view that „polity determines 
politics and policy“ (Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch 2004: 101, cp. Jachtenfuchs 2001). Whereas a great 
deal of attention in this literature has been dedicated especially to the different variants of ‚network 
governance‘ and the decentralised, heterarchical, and discursive forms of policy-making most 
recently epitomised by the Open Method of Coordination, it appears that two aspects in particular 
have been given too little attention: First, too few attempts have been made to locate the analysis of 
these institutional arrangements in a systematical comparative perspective, especially one that 
distinguishes changes and continuities in the evolution of institutional arrangements over time and 
relates these to changes in the effects of EU policy-making. Second, whereas different terms of 
normative democratic theory – especially participation and deliberation – are frequently used in the 
‚governance‘ literature, frequently no explicit distinction is drawn between two levels of analysis: 
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the analytical reconstruction of processes that are related to the legitimization of European 
governance – especially through the adaptation of institutional arrangements to the context of their 
political support and contestation within a policy-making arena –, and the normative evaluation of 
the corresponding development in the terms of democratic theory that remains external to the policy 
process. However, separating these perspectives could keep two questions more distinct – how and 
by what principles institutional arrangements are legitimized, and as how legitimate they appear 
from the viewpoint of democratic theory. 
This paper will make the attempt of elaborating and contrasting these two perspectives. This will be 
done by focusing on EU Social Policy, an area in which a high degree of institutional 
experimentation and a rather strong contestation of the legitimacy of Community governance is 
present. Departing from this background, the question discussed in this paper is twofold: First, how 
has institutional change affected key framework conditions of policy-making that are related to the 
legitimization of European governance in this particular field of governance? And second, how can 
these changes be judged from the viewpoint of democratic theory? The argument to be made from 
the discussion of these questions is twofold: First, a reconstruction of the main developments in the 
policy-field shows that key parameters of the institutional setup – with regard to the distribution of 
power, the setting of institutional frameworks for the interaction of political actors, the definition of 
policy ideas and the mechanisms of institutional evolution itself – appear to have adapted to the 
problematic and fragile legitimacy base of European governance in this field. Second, however, a 
normative assessment of the resulting institutional arrangements reveals legitimacy deficits that can 
be related not just to disequilibria of the input- and output- dimensions of legitimacy, but also to 
tensions between different normative standards of legitimate governance. 
The argument of the paper proceeds in three steps: First, the point of departure is developed through 
the juxtaposition of the developments pushing for the extension of social policy competences of the 
European level and the main arguments concerning its legitimacy base (2.). The two subsequent 
steps discuss the main tendencies of institutional change (3.) and their evaluation with regard to 
democratic legitimacy (4.), before the argument is summarized in a conclusion (5.). 
2. The point of departure: The constitution of the EU as an 
arena of social policy-making on a contested legitimacy base  
It has become almost commonplace to state that demands for a stronger role of the supranational 
level in social policy have to be made against the backdrop of a „constitutional asymmetry“ of 
economic and social – protection issues institutionalized in the basic structure of the Community 
Treaties (Scharpf 2002: 647). From this point of departure, however, arguments for the transfer of 
social policy competences to the Community level have been made both on analytical and normative 
grounds: Departing from the assumption of the prevalence of the mechanism of „negative 
integration“ over the realisation of means of „positive integration“ (Scharpf 1999: 47ff.), the main 
concern in the academic debate with regard to the European dimension of social policy has been 
focused on the possible destructive effects that the dynamic of market integration might have on 
national welfare states. Especially the corresponding notion of a „semi-sovereign welfare state“ that 
would result from the process of European integration makes a strong point for the compensating 
transfer of competences to the European level in the social field (Leibfried/Pierson 2000: 284ff.). 
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On the political level, the advocacy of a “social dimension” of the Common Market since the 1980s 
has also become strongly connected to the normative aspiration of giving broader legitimacy to the 
project of European integration through a social component, although even in the rhetoric of its most 
famous proponent, Jacques Delors, its justification always rested firmly embedded in the project of 
the realisation of the Single Market (Geyer 2000: 45f.). Through this link, the political development 
that has followed on the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986 has not resulted in a complete 
sidelining of social policies, but has led to the ongoing expansion of social policy competences on 
the European level: Following on the intensification of EU regulation due to the introduction of 
qualified majority voting in the field of health and safety in the SEA (cp. Rhodes 1995), especially 
the adoption of the Social Protocol in the Maastricht Treaty made a big step through its extension of 
legislation to important areas of labor law and the establishment of the Social Dialogue, which has 
helped to adopt EU directives in the field of parental leave and „atypical“ work (Falkner 1998, 
2002). Second, the role of the EU in the ongoing debate on the contours and changes of the 
„European Social Model“ has intensified along with the establishment of the Luxembourg 
Employment Strategy and the application of the Open Method of Coordination to the fields of social 
inclusion and pension reform. Through the adoption of these broad and systematic approaches of 
non-legislative coordination, the EU has established its own role not just as the mediator of welfare 
reform, but as an actor capable of defining priorities and making assumptions about the necessity and 
direction of change: Apart from setting a number of qualitative and quantitative „benchmarks“ that 
are set as standards for the scope and direction of employment and welfare reforms in the member 
states, the Commission`s recent Social Policy Agenda stresses the need for an „integrated European 
Union approach aimed at economic and social renewal“, aimed not just at preserving, but 
„modernising the European social model“ (Commission 2000: 7). Furthermore, the process of 
defining a set of common European social rights and values is now close to its final 
institutionalisation through the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the future 
Constitutional Treaty (de Burca 2003: 14ff.). To sum up, although „Social Europe“ is certainly far 
from being a federal welfare state, it has developed into a supranational regime with three elements 
that start resembling ‚stateness‘ – the ability to adopt a significant amount of legislation, a developed 
and differentiated set of institutional arrangements on the supranational level, and the ability to 
define a rather far – reaching set of social rights and political priorities for the member states. 
With regard to its effects for democratic legitimacy, however, it would certainly be wrong to assume 
an unequivocal relationship between this growth of EU competences in social policy and the 
legitimacy of its governance. In fact, both structural and normative arguments are brought forward in 
the academic debate that assume a more problematic, or even adverse relation: First, a strong 
structural obstacle to the harmonisation of the social protection systems certainly consists of the 
large differences in the amount of spending, but also the institutional diversity of welfare states 
according to their adherence to one of the four basic „families“ of welfare (Esping – Andersen 1990, 
Ebbinghaus 1999: 14ff.). Second, and with a stronger emphasis on the normative requirements of 
political integration, a number of authors have referred to the inability of the European system of 
governance to proceed with political issues as strongly concerned with questions of political and 
normative conflict as in social policy. In this vein, strong limitations of the European polity with 
regard to the legitimization of decisions in social policy are assumed due to the lack of adequate 
institutional arrangements for the reconciliation of the relevant social interests, a sufficiently 
integrated public sphere, and not least, the absence of a European form of citizenship with relations 
of solidarity comparable to those in the nation state (Majone 1998: 13f.). Put in terms of democratic 
theory, the degree of „input“ – legitimation that EU institutions can mobilize is considered too feeble 
to sustain an extension of EU competences to areas of distributive social policy and any political 
questions that have an implication for basic ideas of solidarity (Scharpf 1999: 16ff., 2002: 651ff.).
 
Seite 3 von 15 EIoP: Text 2004-007: Full Text
06.07.2004 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-007.htm4
From this point of view, Social Europe would not enhance, but massively put at risk the legitimacy 
of the project of European integration, furthering distrust and alienation of citizens from its 
institutions: „For all these reasons, the development of welfare policies at European level would 
actually aggravate the legitimacy problem, reinforcing the popular image of a highly centralised and 
bureaucratised Community“ (Majone 1998: 14). It is basically from this tension – between the strong 
push towards an extension and intensification of EU activitites in the social field on the one hand, 
and the normative reservations against the transfer of genuine social policy competences to the 
supranational level on the other –, from which normative questions about the appropriateness and 
legitimacy of the institutional arrangements in EU Social Policy arise. 
3. Tendencies of institutional adaptation in the historical 
development of EU Social Policy  
Departing from this point, the first question to be discussed is the following: How has the 
institutional evolution of EU Social Policy adapted to the need to legitimize the competences of the 
supranational level against their political contestation within the policy-making arena? In order to 
develop this question, the development of EU Social Policy will be discussed from a historical 
perspective along four lines that correspond to the main features of historical institutionalism 
identified by Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor (1996: 937ff.) – the role of institutions in structuring 
power relations (3.1.), the way institutions affect actors` behaviour and interactions (3.2.), the 
legitimizing role of ideas and beliefs (3.3.), and the intensity and prevailing mechanisms of 
institutional change itself (3.4.). 
3.1. Towards the multi-actor and multi-level: Building networks and promoting 
subsidiarity  
One of the most striking institutional developments of European Social Policy from its modest 
beginnings after the Social Action Programme 1974 to the present state is the strong tendency of 
horizontal and vertical decentralisation of policy making. Reference was made to a first variant of 
this tendency a few years ago by the observation of a trend „towards multi-actor and multi-level 
governance“ (Falkner 1999: 83ff.). This assumption referred mainly to the introduction of the 
bipartite and tripartite Social Dialogue between trade unions and employers` federations: After being 
entitled to negotiate binding framework agreements through the adoption of the Social Protocol in 
the Maastricht Treaty, the European-level social partners contributed to the legislative activity of the 
Community by the conclusion of agreements on parental leave and various forms of ‚atypical‘ work 
(Falkner 1998: 97ff., Falkner 1999: 83ff.). More recently, this tendency has been taken further 
especially through the inclusion of the Social Partners in tripartite consultations with EU institutions: 
First, as a complement to the coordination of employment (‚Luxembourg process‘) and structural 
economic reform (‚Cardiff process‘), a macro-economic dialogue was set up in 1999, which brings 
together representatives of the ECB, the ministers of finance and the social partners in a regular, 
twice-yearly exchange (Dufresne 2002: 87ff., Deppe et al. 2003: 184). In addition to this, the 
informal summits of the social partners with the heads of government before the meetings of the 
European Council were formalized through the introduction of a tripartite summit for the preparation 
of the annual Spring Summit on the Union`s social and economic policies (EIRO 2003). While 
leading to the dispersal of decision-making processes into policy networks that go beyond the formal 
boundaries of the EU organisations, this tendency appears to aim at the support of the supranational 
institutions by exposing intended pieces of legislation and the coordination of economic and social 
policies to the scrutiny of the social partners, rather than assigning an independent role to civil 
society actors: 
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Whereas the tripartite concertation with the social partners is confined to a non-binding, and rather 
informal exchange of views, the bipartite Social Dialogue has so far remained under the firm control 
of the Commission, which originated all negotiated framework agreements through its intitial 
proposals. The function of this part of decentralisation is therefore mainly supportive of the 
Community institutions, and of policy-making at the supranational level. 
This distinguishes it from a second, quite distinct variant of vertical decentralisation in recent years 
that is also tied to the transfer of policy – making functions to the EU level, but affects more directly 
the allocation of competences between the Union and member states. Particularly prominent in this 
regard are the relatively new forms of non-legislative coordination of member states`s employment 
and social policies that were developed after the inclusion of an employment chapter into the Treaty 
of Amsterdam and the ensuing European Employment Strategy (Goetschy 1999, 2003, 
Foden/Magnusson 2003). After the introduction of the quite similar, but less formalized Open 
Method of Coordination through the Lisbon European Council in March 2000, the cycle of setting 
guidelines, drawing up of National Action Plans and a joint evaluation process led by the 
Community institutions has been applied to a number of social policy areas, including the reduction 
of social exclusion and poverty, the reform of pension systems, and in the future also the reform of 
health care systems (de la Porte/Pochet 2002). On the level of the vertical distribution of powers 
between the supranational level and the member states, the new procedures combine a strongly 
extended function of the EU in the setting of political goals and the definition of guidelines with a 
framework of action that does not create the conditions for the achievement of „positive integration“, 
but lays a particularly strong stress on the diversity and autonomy of member states (Scharpf 2002: 
652ff., Mosher/Trubek 2003: 68ff.). Politically speaking, this sharing of functions offers potential 
gains to both political levels: Whereas allowing for the establishment of a broad and differentiated 
„legitimizing discourse“ of the EU that is framed by the „Lisbon strategy“ and covers a whole range 
of social, economic, and structural policies through the Open Method of Coordination (Radaelli 
2003: 7), the member states do not have to cede a large amount of competences and might actually 
use the new framework for strategies of selective adaptation or „blame avoidance“. Second, with 
regard to the balance of powers within the institutional framework of the EU, the new procedures 
have strengthened primarily intergovernmental, and executive institutions: Apart from stressing the 
goal-setting function of the European Council (especially its „spring“ formation responsible for the 
coordination of social and economic policies of the Union), all relevant decision-making processes 
of the OMC are taken through the interaction of the Council of Ministers and the Commission, 
whereas the role of the European Parliament is reduced to the issuing of recommendations, and the 
traditionally strong role of the ECJ in social policy is completely sidelined due to the legally non-
binding character of all measures (Radaelli 2003: 14ff., Göbel 2002: 145ff.). Furthermore, the 
structure of inter-institutional relations takes on a more informal shape, giving rise to a growing 
relevance of expert bodies like the Social Protection Committee, the Employment Committee, and 
the Economic and Financial Committee, and their interaction with the responsible Commission 
directorates and Council formations (Göbel 2002: 59ff., de la Porte/Pochet 2003: 35). In short, 
whereas a strong rationale exists for the adoption of the non-legislative forms of coordination on the 
grounds of member state diversity and autonomy, these do not just amount to more effective or 
cooperative styles of policy-making. Instead of leading to a dispersal of power relations, the 
decentralisation dynamic in the institutional development of EU Social Policy appears primarily as 
an instrument for the deliberate splitting of competences between different political levels, the 
strengthening of certain focal points in the policy-making process and the safeguarding of the 
autonomy of the most relevant political actors. Within this development, a shift of focus is 
discernible in the allocation of decision-making competences: In the sequence of events from the 
Maastricht treaty to the end-1990s, it appears that the main dynamic of institutional decentralisation 
of EU governance has turned from a first variant, which appears largely supportive of the allocation 
of competences on the supranational level, to the much more pronounced emphasis on the autonomy 
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3.2. Proceduralisation of policy-making: from rule-setting to preference formation  
Concerning the second dimension of analysis – the way institutions influence the behaviour, 
preference formation and interaction of actors – two main theoretical currents have developed in the 
institutionalist literature: First, the rationalist or ‚calculus‘ approach that focuses on instrumental 
behaviour and strategic interaction of actors, treats preferences as exogenous from institutional 
contexts, and concentrates on the function of institutions as devices for the setting of rules for the 
attainment of decisions and their enforcement; second, the sociological-constructivist or ‚cultural‘ 
approach that includes values, norms and symbols in its definition of institutions and extends their 
function to the setting of normative and cognitive orientations that affect the worldviews and 
identities of actors, thus treating preferences as endogenous to institutional contexts. In 
correspondence to these differing conceptualisation of institutions, the behaviour of actors is 
explained and interpreted according to a ‚logic of consequentiality‘ that is aimed at the realisation of 
given preferences through strategic behaviour on the one hand, and to a ‚logic of appropriateness‘ 
through which actors adapt their preferences and behaviour to the rules and values that are given in a 
particular situation, on the other (cp. Hall/Taylor 1996: 939f., March/Olsen 1989: 21ff., Pollack 
2004: 138f., Risse 2004: 160ff.). The eclectic use of parts of both theories in historical institutionalist 
analyses (Hall/Taylor 1996: 940) is mirrored in different analyses of European social policy that lean 
on this approach: A good example are the differences between the rationalist premises in Pierson`s 
analysis (Pierson 1996: 148ff.), and the reconstruction of a process of „joint preference formation“ in 
Falkner`s analysis of the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Social Protocol, which leans 
much more on elements of sociological institutionalism, such as the relevance of ideas and learning 
processes (Falkner 1998: 200ff., Falkner 2002: 112ff.). Beyond the theoretical debate, the opposition 
of the two logics of explanation is also a valuable tool to show how the functions of institutions have 
changed over time: As a temporal perspective shows, the function of the institutional arrangements 
in EU Social Policy has shifted from the formal and transparent setting of rules for processes of 
decision-making to the institutionalisation of procedural mechanisms that foster communicative 
interaction, the exchange of information, and the development of preferences. Politically, this change 
is linked to the pursuit of a tendency of proceduralisation that aims not just at the overcoming of 
blocks to the process of policy-making, but also at the deliberate reinforcement of the preference-
formation function of institutions in the evolution of EU Social Policy, along with the increasing 
dilution of their rule-setting function. 
A first indicator of this development is the change in the logic of decision-making through the 
reduction of veto options and the setting of incentives for negotiations that has occurred in the 
subsequent phases of institutional evolution since the mid-1970s: Being confined to unanimous 
voting in the Council, decision-making after the Social Action Programme in 1974 allowed for the 
taking of veto-positions by any of the actors involved, thus maximising the incentives for the 
strategic pursuit of interests and practically excluding mechanisms of bargaining (Geyer 2000: 36ff.). 
A first change to this was introduced through the adoption of qualified majority voting in the area of 
health and safety of workers (Art. 118a) in the Single European Act in 1986: Apart from diluting the 
veto option for each government, this change gave the Commission a certain leeway in building 
coalitions and stretching its mandate by the extensive interpretation of the Treaty base (such as in the 
case of the 1993 Working Time Directive, cp. Rhodes 1995: 99ff.). A further strong incentive for a 
negotiation-oriented style of policy-making was set through the adoption of the Social Protocol, 
which added the Social Dialogue as a second track of negotiation about the content of future 
directives, apart from the conventional route through the Community institutions. 
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It is especially through the interconnection of both tracks – as proposals from failed negotiations 
between the Social Partners can be taken back to the institutional route – that a strong incentive has 
been set for both social partner organisations to work for a consensus in the negotiation of 
framework agreements. Through the application of this subtle pressure on the relevant actors, a 
procedural exchange was realized that both fosters, and could build on on the gradual evolution of 
shared beliefs and ideas between the social partners (Falkner 1998: 200f., Falkner 2002: 113). The 
main result of this process of institution building was to overcome the structural barriers that had 
impeded the attainment of consensus, expressed in the dilemma of the „joint decision trap“ and the 
difficulties of reaching the approval of the employers` European federation of entering into binding 
agreements with the trade union side (Streeck 1995: 415f.). 
Again, in contrast to this supportive approach of trying to support the EU`s capacity to accommodate 
the conflicting interests in a consensus and reach binding decisions, a second, more recent strategy to 
address the „decision – making problem“ of the European level has been the introduction of various 
mechanisms of „soft governance“. It appears as the characteristic approach of these mechanisms that 
conflicts between differing actors and interests are not solved, but circumvented: A first instance of 
this approach is the increasing tendency towards the adoption of „neo – voluntarism“, facilitating the 
political agreement on pieces of EU regulation by granting flexibility clauses, exemptions, and 
reducing interventions to recommendations (Streeck 1995: 423ff.). A still more consequent step to 
shift the function of EU Social Policy from the attainment of binding decisions to the construction of 
a discourse that aims mainly at the shaping of preferences is the adoption of the Employment 
Strategy and the OMC. Both of these procedures are also strong efforts at de-blocking the policy 
process in the social field by reducing the need to integrate all interests in the reaching of binding 
decisions. In this vein, the approach of non-legislative coordination has reached a high degree of 
elaboration, especially through the systematic and iterative methodology of the coordination cycles, 
its foundation on an increasingly differentiated set of guidelines, indicators, and the statistical data 
developed by the Commission and the responsible expert committees, and its promotion on the 
highest political level of the European Council in the framework of an overarching political strategy. 
These qualify the OMC as an approach that goes far beyond its precursors of non – legislative 
coordination in European Social Policy, such as the drafting of the ‚social budgets‘ in the 1970/80s, 
the 1993 recommendation on the convergence of social protection systems, and the early attempts of 
building an employment strategy until the Essen monitoring procedure in 1994 and the Luxembourg 
summit in 1997 (Goetschy 1999: 118ff., Göbel 2002: 161ff., Geyer 2000: 157ff.). A remarkable 
feature of this overall shift of the institutional framework to functions stressed in the ‚cultural‘ 
variant of new institutionalism is that it has not just occurred as a side – effect of the ongoing process 
of integration, but as the result of a quite deliberate political strategy, aiming at a re-definition of EU 
Social Policy as a field of governance focused on the development and dissemination of ideas and 
knowledge, rather than the setting of transparent and enforceable rules (Mosher/Trubek 2003: 79ff.). 
3.3. Connecting to the Lisbon goals: The re-definition of the European Social 
Model?  
At the level of policy ideas, the development of EU Social Policy is certainly first of all a story of 
expansion, having grown from very confined activities of the EC in the area of workers` freedom of 
movement to the establishment of full-fledged policy programs that include core welfare policies 
such as social inclusion, pensions, and employment. What is striking, however, is that this 
broadening of scope is accompanied by a somewhat evasive strategy of legitimization: 
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Especially in the more recent phases, the definition of European Social Policy, and its relation to the 
idea of a “European Social Model” is developed not in contrast, but as a complement to goals of 
market integration, and shows a profile that is strongly in favour of elements of diversity and 
includes many elements that are ambiguous or left open to interpretation. The first of these elements 
is present in the definition of social policy as a „productive factor“ in the Commission`s current 
agenda for the years 2000-2006, which is further underlined through the realisation of studies 
directed at the proof of the „costs of non-social policy“ (cp. Fouarge 2003, Rubery et al. 2003). 
Furthermore, by integrating social policy into the „Lisbon strategy“ as one component in a 
synergetic triangle with economic and employment policies (Commission 2000: 8), an effort is made 
to build a connection of the social agenda to the famous legitimizing formula for growth, flexibility, 
and competitiveness propagated through the strategy. At the level of policy programs, the general 
tendency of European welfare policy towards the paradigm of the „activating welfare state“ has been 
adopted, with strong emphasis on the employability and adaptability of workers and the adoption of 
a supply-side approach to economic and social policies. This certainly marks a contrast to the more 
regulatory, interventionist and state-oriented approaches of earlier phases, especially the one marked 
by Delors`s program for a „structured economic area“ (Deppe et al. 2003: 186ff.). However, even 
within this shift of focus, the EU programs work with a considerable amount of ambiguity, taking up 
a number of different influences and being adaptable to a variety of contexts across the different 
„families“ of welfare states and labor markets. Thus, the Employment Strategy shows equally strong 
affinities with typically Scandinavian and social democratic conceptions of employment policy as 
with the Blairite „third way“ and more strongly neo-liberal conceptions, therefore rather reflecting 
and compromising between a number of different approaches from current discussions in the 
member states than setting up an entirely new one (Trubek/Mosher 2003: 71ff., Goetschy 1999: 
124ff.). This is mirrored by the fact that with regard to the recommendations set out in the evaluation 
of the National Action Plans by the Commission and Council, no single ‚type‘ of labor market 
emerges as the clear favorite, although the Scandinavian countries receive a much smaller, and 
especially the continental and Southern European countries a bigger number of recommendations (de 
la Porte/Pochet 2002: 37). Still, the principles and guidelines set up by the EU strategy appear 
flexible enough to be endorsed by all member states and be integrated quite smoothly into their labor 
market programs: As the first 5-year evaluation of the EES has shown, quite different labor market 
regimes can identify with the European guidelines, with the three Scandinavian countries and the UK 
reporting almost ‚total compatibility‘ of their labor market strategies with the EU requirements, and 
other (more critically evaluated) countries such as Italy and Spain insisting that the guidelines have 
reinforced, rather than introduced, pre-existing tendencies and processes (de la Porte/Pochet 2003: 
43ff.). Concerning the actual effects of the European strategy in the member states, empirical 
evidence so far suggests some EU-induced changes in specific sectors – such as the coordination of 
labor market policies between different ministries of the realization of equal opportunity 
programmes – rather than a change of paradigms in member states or the convergence towards a 
single type of labor market policy (de la Porte/Pochet 2003: 45, Goetschy 2003: 82ff.). At least for 
the case of employment, this gives evidence to the view that EU governance in the social field has 
added a rather broad and multifaceted, not actually very innovative, and quite permissive framework 
of guidelines to the activities of the member states. With regard to the legitimization of policy 
programs, this corresponds to the interest of reconciling different models of welfare represented by 
the member states in the definition of the EU`s social agenda, which supplements and differentiates, 
but does not question the overall – and more deeply institutionalised – agenda for liberalisation and 
competitiveness. 
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3.4. The flexibilisation of institutional change  
Concerning the form and causality of institutional change itself, it appears that processes of informal 
and experimental institution-building have been employed to overcome the restrictions and path-
dependencies of institutional change that are emphasised by historical institutionalist analyses 
(Hall/Taylor 1996: 941). For the case of EC Social Policy, impressive evidence of such effects has 
been given especially by Pierson`s analysis, which concentrates on the restrictions of „member state 
control“ over the Community`s institutions due to the restricted time horizons of policy makers, the 
unintended consequences of Treaty Articles, and the strong barriers to any encompassing 
institutional reform (Pierson 1996: 148ff.). However, in order to explain the strong elements of 
dynamism that are evident in this field – including a whole set of procedures and institutional 
arrangements that were introduced in the roughly fifteen years after the adoption of the Single 
European Act –, it does not appear satisfactory to refer just to unintended consequences and gaps in 
member state control, which are left as practically the only means for the explanation for change 
(ibid.: 156). More conclusive insights into the evolution of institutional arrangements can be taken 
from the distinction of the level of formal institutional creation, led by the enacting coalition of 
actors responsible for Treaty changes in the framework of Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), 
and the level of institutional operation in the interregnum phases between those ‚grand bargains‘. On 
this second level, more informal, but equally relevant institutional changes are effected by the 
executing coalition of actors responsible for the unfolding and application of those provisions in 
everyday policy-making (cp. Lindner/Rittberger 2003: 445ff., Farrell/Heritier 2003: 3ff.). 
Concerning the case of social policy, it appears that while the creation of institutional innovations 
has become increasingly less confined to the formal institutional creation phase during the IGCs, the 
executing coalition of political actors involved in the institutional operation phases has carved out a 
decisive role in creating, negotiating and also implementing new informal institutional arrangements, 
which where then ratified through Treaty changes. Again, a first example is the enactment of the 
Social Protocol in the Maastricht Treaty, which was not only preceded by a longer phase of 
negotiations between the member states and Commission, but could also build on a social partner 
agreement on the provisions of the Social Dialogue. The enactment of new provisions in the Treaties 
was thus based on processes which went far beyond the confined (and very controversial) bargaining 
situation at the Maastricht conference: „It is thus essential not to restrict the analysis to the 1991 IGC 
itself“ (Falkner 1998: 88). Again, this development has been taken further in the following phases, in 
which the role of the IGC was practically reduced to the ratification of innovations that had been 
prepared over various years in the institutional operation phase: The main innovation in EU Social 
Policy brought by the 1996 IGC in Amsterdam, the inclusion of an employment chapter, was mainly 
a formalization of an ongoing process following on the Commission`s 1993 White Paper and the 
Essen Council in 1994. Through these steps, practically all relevant parts of the Employment 
Strategy (such as action plans, guidelines and indicators) had already been developed under the 
auspices of the Commission before they became institutionalised in the Treaty (Goetschy 1999: 
120ff.). This form of a more informal and experimental introduction of changes, which is less bound 
to the restrictions of the IGCs, is still intensified through the introduction of the Open Method of 
Coordination. Here, the European Council has confined its role to the setting of general guidelines, 
which are then adapted to different policy fields even without a formal treaty base for the method as 
such (Radaelli 2003: 11). Therefore, whereas arguments about the barriers to the reform of existing 
institutions are important for the form and direction of change, they do not preclude the possibility of 
encompassing institutional changes as such: Through the ‚layering‘ of institutions in the ongoing 
addition of new procedures and instruments to the existing ones, which was mostly coupled to steps 
of further economic integration (especially in the cases of the Social Protocol and the Employment 
Strategy), rather fundamental changes have become institutionalized even in absence of an 
encompassing revision of all social policy provisions.
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Rather than the classical historical institutionalist argument that „like Frankenstein`s monster, 
structure takes on a life on its own“ (Aspinwall/Schneider 2000: 10), it is the change to more flexible 
and dynamic relations between the levels of institutional creation and institutional operation that 
account for a great part of the dynamism in the recent evolution of EU Social Policy. What matters 
about this argument is that it shows how a strategy was found to circumvent the restrictions on 
attempts of deliberate institutional design in the bargaining situation of the IGCs – and thus to 
encounter a more flexible, and dynamic way of adjusting the EU`s institutional structure to demands 
for an extension of EU competences in the social field. 
To sum up: With regard to the four dimensions of institutional analysis discussed above, it is 
possible to identify tendencies of institutional development that have contributed to the adaptation of 
EU Social Policy to its fragile legitimacy base especially by avoiding a „strong“ form of 
supranationalisation, and by attempting to connect and reconcile apparently contradictory principles 
and elements: 
z a tendency of decentralisation, which is aiming both at the support and the limitation of the 
political authority of the supranational institutions. While leading to the horizontal and vertical 
dispersal of competences to a variety of actors and levels of decision-making, one of the 
effects of this tendency is also the concentration of political power in some focal points of the 
multi-level network, especially its executive and intergovernemental components in the Open 
Method of Coordination;  
z a tendency of proceduralisation, aiming at the solution of the ‚decision-making problem‘, ie 
the difficulty of reconciling and integrating conflicting political interests in binding decisions. 
While helping to overcome the blockades in decision-making of earlier phases, the effect of 
this development is the concentration of European policy-making on processes of information 
exchange and preference formation, whereas the actual integration of interests through rule-
setting and decision-making is reduced and delegated to lower levels.  
z The expansion and differentiation of the ideas and contents of EU Social Policy, aiming at the 
legitimization of the role of the EU in the identification and modernisation of the „European 
Social Model“. Whereas this development has gone a long way in defining Community-wide 
guidelines and principles, its justification remains evasive in many elements, with a strong 
commitment to its connection to the principles of market integration and member state 
diversity.  
z a tendency towards more informal, inclusive and experimental forms of institutional change, 
aiming at the attempt to overcome the difficulties of adjusting the institutional base of EU 
Social Policy to the overall progress in European integration. Whereas these changes have 
contributed to a reduction of the „stickiness“ and path-dependency of institutional 
development, they reinforce the role of informal processes of institutionalisation, the 
„layering“ of instruments and mechanisms, and the resulting heterogenity of the institutional 
arrangement.  
4. The viewpoint of democratic theory: two approaches   
How can these institutional developments be judged from the viewpoint of democratic legitimacy? 
Whereas an elaborate investigation of this question would require a separate paper, the argument 
proposed in this article will confine itself to outlining two theoretical approaches to legitimacy 
deficits that follow from the institutional developments discussed above: 
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First, in an institution-centered perspective, an imbalance appears between the development of the 
input- and output-dimensions of legitimacy (Scharpf 1999: 16ff.): Through the general increase in 
the „decision-making capacity“ of the EU in the social field, and the extension of Community 
policy-making to core areas of social and employment policies, the overall ‚output‘ of European 
Social Policy has globally increased in terms of acts of legislation, but also in its more subtle 
presence in the definition of social and employment guidelines. While being more actively involved 
in a wide range of social policy questions, however, one standard of ‚output‘-legitimacy that the EU 
has not been able to fulfil is a sufficient degree of „accountability of results“ (Majone 1998: 24). The 
main deficit addressed here concerns the clear specification of political goals and their visible and 
transparent realisation: As stated before, not just the ambivalence of many of the EU`s policy 
guidelines in the framework of Open Coordination, but also its tendency towards „neo-voluntarist“ 
regulation and ‚soft‘ mechanisms of governance are elements that put especially this standard of 
output-legitimacy into question. Given the overall increase in the scope and political weight of the 
‘output’ of EU Social Policy, a point needs to be made for stronger mechanisms of input-legitimation 
– that is, a higher degree of participation, a better procedural accountability and possibly the 
approximation towards deliberative forms of decision-making. However, an evaluation of 
developments at the input-side shows equally strong deficiencies: Although the introduction of co-
decision by the European Parliament in important areas of social legislation and the significant role 
of the social partners have undoubtedly led to a greater openness of decision-making in comparison 
to the intergovernmental model that prevailed until the 1980s, the Commission and Council of 
Ministers still remain in firm control of the policy process – with an actually more pronounced role 
for intergovernmental and executive institutions in the recent trend towards the Open Method of 
Coordination. Apart from that, deliberation is certainly present in many elements of the present 
institutional arrangement with its emphasis on expert-led discourse, the gathering of information and 
the dissemination of “best practice” in the framework of Open Coordination (Teague 2001). 
However, it is much less present in the sense of trying to create a normative consensus of what 
values should hold the „European Social Model“ together, and to mediate a consistent idea of Social 
Europe to a wider public sphere as a part of the project of European integration. Comparing the 
procedural and substantive aspects of deliberation, the definition of the contents of EU Social Policy 
not just seems too politicized, but also by far too ambivalent and open to interpretation to be actually 
based on the idea of an argumentation-based, deliberative consensus – especially in the absence of a 
wider parliamentary or public debate. Furthermore, it appears as the most problematic consequence 
of the tendencies of decentralisation and proceduralisation that accountability is also put into 
question at the ‚input‘-side of policy-making. In this regard, not just the dispersal of political 
responsibilities into policy-networks that are both horizontally differentiated and spread over the 
vertical axis between the EU and member states, but also the informalization of policy-making and 
the omission of parliamentary and judicial control appear as principle deficits especially of non-
legislative coordination. From this point of view, therefore, an imbalance exists primarily between 
the growing political output of the EU level in the social field, and the lack of mechanisms to 
provide for sufficient mechanisms of legitimation at the ‘input’-side of policy-making. 
Second, much of what has been said above must be interpreted not just along the divide of 
procedural and substantial standards of legitimacy, but rather between different normative standards 
of democratically legitimate governance. In this vein, a normative evaluation of the present 
institutional arrangement by the standard of responsive governance – that corresponds to the 
standard of participation on the input-side, and the decision-making capacity on the output-side of 
politics – would actually establish a rather positive view on many of the institutional developments 
in EU Social Policy. 
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It would also endorse its multi-level and network character and the principle of ‚soft‘ governance in 
areas where more binding and interventionist approaches can not be established without the risk of 
frequent blockades in decision-making. A reverse perspective, however, is established from the 
standard of accountable governance. From this point of view, in which the present governance 
arrangement in EU Social Policy appears deficient with regard to both the input- and the output-side 
of politics, a normative recommendation for the future development of European Social policy 
would have to point in the way of a simpler, more formalized and more clear-cut system of 
governance. This would have to make a more restrained use of ‚flexible‘, and a more consequent use 
of binding instruments, the actual purpose and outcome of which could be shown more transparently 
and thoroughly. Finally, a third perspective on European governance is established by approaches of 
deliberative democracy: From this point of departure, the normative critique of the present 
governance arrangement in EU Social Policy would have to focus on the fit between processes of 
arguing, reason-giving, and the collection of knowledge on the input-side of politics, and the actual 
ability of EU policy-makers of basing the contents of Community policies on an argumentative 
agreement that can be made transparent to a wider public on its output-side. These three normative 
standards of democratically legitimate governance are certainly demanding – but as the argument 
shows, they actually cut across the divide between the input- and output-side of politics. As such, the 
distinction of these criteria might prove useful in providing different normative standards that 
arguments about the legitimacy of EU governance might be angled towards. 
5. Conclusion  
To sum up, the purpose of this paper has been to point to the paradoxical relationship between the 
institutional development of EU governance in the social field and its democratic legitimacy: On the 
one hand, a historical reconstruction reveals a set of tendencies in the evolution of institutions that 
helped to legitimize the assumption of social policy competences by the EU level against the 
backdrop of its rather weak and contested legitimacy base. On the other hand, a normative evaluation 
of the resulting institutional arrangements show legitimacy deficits that can be identified with regard 
to the input- and output-dimensions of legitimacy, but also in comparison between different 
normative standards of legitimate governance. The main conclusion of this paper, therefore, is that a 
paradox exists between the institutional adaptation of EU governance to demands for its 
legitimization within the policy process, and a normative evaluation of these changes from the 
external perspective of democratic theory. To discuss the contrast between these two perspectives, 
and to locate them in a systematic comparative perspective is a question that the discussion about 
institutional change in the EU should more thoroughly address. 
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